When multinationals face lower tax rates abroad than in the US, transfer pricing strategies generate an asymmetry in the tax rates on a project's profits and losses.
Introduction
The high level of the statutory corporate income tax rate in the US, relative to that of many developed economies, has received significant attention as a driving force behind US multinationals' business decisions. In the context of domestically operating firms, it has long been recognized that taxes can influence a firm's attitude towards risk (e.g., Domar and Musgrave (1944) ; Green and Talmor (1985) ; Smith and Stulz (1985) ). In spite of this, there has been little attention paid to how firms' foreign operations and the di↵erences in US and foreign corporate tax rates may a↵ect the risk-taking of US firms.
In this paper, we show that the relatively high US tax rate, along with the ability of firms to shift intangible capital across their global operations at discounted transfer prices, can a↵ect the riskiness and scale of projects undertaken by US firms.
1 For example, consider a firm that develops intangible capital in the US. The expenses associated with the development provides a valuable deduction against the firm's US income that is taxed at a relatively high US rate. In practice, the firm can use transfer pricing to move the intangible capital to its foreign subsidiary at a price below its fair market value, shifting overseas the profits generated by these assets. These profits are then taxed at relatively low foreign rates. We show that typical transfer pricing strategies produce an asymmetry in the tax rates faced on the gains and losses of a project with transferable capital. This generates convexity in the after-tax payo↵s of these projects. Facing convex payo↵s, firms have incentive to increase the riskiness and scale of these projects with transferable capital.
We use a model of a firm's joint decision of project risk and scale to illustrate how di↵er-ential tax rates and transfer pricing strategies firm policies. The model shows that a transfer pricing strategy can be expressed as a long position in a call option on the development of transferable capital or intellectual property. This call option component of the after-tax payo↵ leads the firm to choose a project that is larger and riskier. We show that, somewhat 1 Pomerleau (2017) reports that, as of 2017, the US has the fourth highest statutory corporate income tax rate in the world. While the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 reduced the US federal corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%, it remains much higher than those in tax havens. For instance, Bermuda does not tax corporate income. 1 surprisingly, an increase in the US tax rate can lead to an increase in the choice of project scale and risk. Furthermore, we show that under certain conditions this can lead the firm to invest more in a project than it would in an alternative case of zero taxes. The model highlights the relevance of a firm's other taxable income and the di↵erence in US and foreign tax rates for the choice of project scale and risk.
We then empirically test these predictions for the relationship between corporate tax rates and firm risk taking. Using geographic segment data, we construct a panel of the foreign operations of US firms for the period 1998-2015. We follow the prior literature in using the volatility of firm profitability as a proxy for corporate risk taking (John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) ). With this sample, we perform two sets of analyses.
In our first approach, we consider the simple correlation between the tax convexity and risk taking. We find that the tax convexity and risk taking are positively related, as predicted by the model. A natural concern is that this correlation is driven by selection. For example, young tech firms may have both volatile cash flows and operations in tax havens. We evaluate this concern by controlling for age and including industry fixed e↵ects. The positive association between the tax convexity and risk taking remains.
As a second approach, we consider the e↵ect of major foreign tax changes. The advantage of this type of analysis is that it allows us to assess the dynamics of the e↵ect of the tax convexity on risk taking. It also allows us to examine whether our e↵ect is driven by trends in the treatment (firms subject to a major foreign tax change) or control (firms not subject to such a change) group prior to treatment. The estimates indicate that firms promptly adjust their risk taking following treatment and do not anticipate major tax changes. While this setting remains an approximation of the experimental ideal, the latter result is consistent with the notion that changes in tax convexity cause firms to adjust their risk taking. Broadly speaking, our results from both approaches are consistent with the prediction that the tax convexity generates the incentive for multinationals to undertake riskier projects.
It has long been recognized in the corporate finance literature that features of the corporate tax code can make the relationship between a firm's taxable income and its tax liability nonlinear. In particular, prior work has focused on two features-a progressive tax rate schedule and the limited ability to utilize loss carryforwards-that make a firm's tax liability a convex function of its taxable income.
2
Smith and Stulz (1985) show that when a firm faces a convex tax liability, it can reduce its expected tax liability and increase firm value by hedging or engaging in other activities that reduce the volatility of its taxable income. They also note that taxes may give firms a motive to hedge in order to increase their debt capacity.
3 Graham and Smith (1999) estimate tax liability functions for a sample of Compustat firms and find convexity in about half of their sample. Graham and Rogers (2002) empirically find firms hedge in order to increase debt capacity but do not find evidence of hedging in response to tax function convexity.
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Green and Talmor (1985) and Majd and Myers (1985) show that the government's tax claim on a firm's profits can be viewed as a call option. The firm has a short position in this call option and therefore would like to reduce the volatility of taxable income to reduce its expected tax liability. Green and Talmor (1985) show that this convex tax liability reduces the firm's incentive to take on risk, giving incentive to underinvest and engage in conglomerate, diversifying mergers. 5 We show that in the international setting, this prediction for corporate risk taking may be reversed. Favilukis, Giammarino, and Pizarro (2016) and Schiller (2015) study how corporate taxes and the structure of tax loss carryforwards a↵ect the riskiness of equity returns. Ljungqvist, Zhang, and Zuo (2017) use changes in the level of corporate tax rates across US states to study how tax rates a↵ect firm risk-taking. They find that the average firm in their sample reduces its risk-taking in response to a state-level tax increase, but does not increase risk-taking in response to a cut. Becker, Johannesen, and Riedel (2018) studies the relation between taxes and the allocation of risk within the firm.
In contrast, our focus is on firms' overall risk taking, not its distribution. See also Ross (1996) and Leland (1998) .
Using survey data on firms' usage of derivatives, Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) find that firms facing a more convex tax function, proxied by the amount of net operating losses, are more likely to hedge.
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More recently, Langenmayr and Lester (2017) and Ljungqvist, Zhang, and Zuo (2017) provide empirical evidence consistent with Green and Talmor (1985) . Osswald and Sureth-Sloane (2017) shows that country risk weakens the association between tax loss o↵sets and risk taking.
2 Transfer pricing of intangible capital
Large firms are often comprised of a set of legally distinct entities. To be concrete, consider the case of a pharmaceutical company headquartered in the US that is developing a drug for sale in both the US and foreign markets. Suppose the firm has an Irish subsidiary.
Typically, the Irish subsidiary will be separately incorporated from the US parent. Legal contracts define the relationships among the entities that constitute the firm. Often, the US parent will wholly own the equity of the Irish subsidiary.
As a consequence, property must be sold (or similarly legally transferred, but not given) from the parent to the Irish subsidiary. IRS regulations require that these transfers occur at"arm's length" prices. In other words, if the Irish subsidiary handles the firm's non-US sales of the drug, it must pay the US parent the market value of the right to sell the drug abroad.
If the parent bears the full risk of developing the drug, the payment from the subsidiary to the parent must be higher than if the subsidiary shares in the risk of development.
Although the transfers are required to take place at market prices, the item being transferred may be highly di↵erentiated. As such, a market price may be di cult to determine.
Following the example, the value of the drug developed by the pharmaceutical company's US parent may be genuinely ambiguous if it is new and lacks a counterpart that is sold in the market. Similarly, the share of the risk borne by the Irish subsidiary in developing the drug may be di cult to precisely quantify in economic terms.
In practice, if the development of the drug looks unlikely to produce a viable product, the US parent may choose to record the full development expense in the US, shielding its other domestic taxable income from the relatively high US corporate income tax rate. Conversely, if the drug's development looks primising, the parent may cost share the right to sell the drug abroad to the Irish subsidiary at price below its market value. The profits that accrue at the Irish subsidiary would then be subject to the relatively low Irish corporate tax rate.
Cost sharing agreements are generally not publicly available. Consequently, the degree to which transfer pricing undercuts the conceptual arm's length standard is di cult to ascertain.
However, Bernard et al. (2006) suggests it is substantial for US multinationals, particularly for di↵erentiated goods, where they estimate it ranges from 52.8% to 66.7%.
6 Moreover, anecdotally, the IRS rarely challenges cost sharing agreements. As a result, firms plausibly transfer intangible capital on favorable terms.
Model
A multinational firm can undertake a new project in which it jointly chooses the scale and riskiness. Specifically, the firm chooses an amount C to spend on R&D and project risk . The project produces intellectual property (IP), which can be transferred and utilized by all of the firms operations. The pre-tax value of the project's IP is XC ↵ , where ↵ < 1,
and
This specification for µ( ) implies that there is a value of that maximizes the expected value of X and therefore the expected pre-tax payo↵ on the project.
In the event that the R&D investment is successful (XC ↵ C > 0), the firm can apply this IP to all of its operations. We assume a fraction ✓ of the firm's operations are abroad, and the income from these operations is subject to a foreign tax rate of ⌧ F . The remaining 1 ✓ of operations are located in the US and subject to a US tax rate of ⌧ US . All of the R&D is performed in the US and recorded as a US expense for tax purposes. The project payo↵s before taxes are ✓XC ↵ abroad and (1 ✓)XC ↵ C in the US.
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For commodities, they estimate a price reduction of 8.8% to 17.6%. Cristea and Nguyen (2016) find similar magnitudes for tangible goods transferred within Danish firms. Davies et al. (2018) find intrafirm prices are 11% lower than market prices for French firms. 
No taxes
With no taxes, the firm's problem is simply
subject to the constraint C > 0, > 0. With our assumption of lognormality for X, the first-order condition for is
which gives the optimal volatility choicê
The optimal choice of C is given bŷ
The NPV of the project is
Constant single tax rate
If the firm faces a single tax rate of ⌧ for any level or source of income, then the optimal choice of scale C and risk for the project is the same as in the case of no taxes. The firm's problem is
While taxes here will a↵ect the NPV of the project, the first order conditions are the same as in the zero tax case and so the optimal choices of C and are unchanged by the presence 6 of taxes.
U.S. and foreign taxes with transfer pricing
Now we consider the case where the firm faces a di↵erent tax rate on its foreign operations (⌧ F ) than domestic operations (⌧ US ). Throughout, we assume that the US corporate tax rate exceeds the foreign rate, ⌧ US > ⌧ F , giving the firm incentive to shift profits from the US to the lower tax foreign jurisdictions.
We assume that the R&D is performed entirely in the U.S., resulting in an expense for U.S. tax purposes. This assumption is loosely consistent with the fact that US multinationals perform more than 80% of their R&D in the US. 7 However, the intangible capital resulting from the R&D has value for both the domestic and foreign operations. We use ✓ to denote the fraction of foreign operations. That is, the pre-tax value of the intangible capital is ✓XC ↵ for the foreign operations and (1 ✓)XC ↵ for the domestic operations.
In the event that the project has a positive outcome where XC ↵ C > 0, we assume that the firm can transfer the intangible capital to its foreign operations at price p(X, C, ✓).
The firm is assumed to be able to transfer this intangible capital at a discount of its fair market value:
The case in which the intangible capital is transferred at a price of ✓C corresponds to one where the R&D expense is allocated proportionally: ✓ fraction of the firm's operations are abroad and it allocates ✓ fraction of its R&D expense to these foreign operations. In computing comparative statics from the model, we assume the firm uses this proportional allocation such that its transfer price is p(X, C, ✓) = ✓C. Given the parameter values listed in Table 1 , this implies a relatively conservative average discount of 9% in the transfer price. In 2015 (the most recent year for which finalized data are available at the time of writing), the US parents of multinational firms performed $277,787 million in R&D. Their majority-owned subsidiaries performed $56,096 million. Majority owned subsidiaries represent the bulk of US multinationals' foreign operations, accounting for roughly 86% of all foreign subsidiaries' sales ($5,950,947 million of $6,871,187 million) (Bureau of Economic Analysis (2018)).
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That is, for the optimally chosen and C, the transfer price to market value ratio is
We assume the firm has other contemporaneous US income from operations, Y 0, and this is known in advance of the project decision. In this case, if the project generates a loss (XC ↵ C < 0) that exceeds the other taxable income Y , then the full amount of the project loss isn't captured for tax purposes. If we ignore the ability to carry forward losses, then the project's payo↵ can be divided into three regions:
In this case, the project's losses exceed the other income Y and so the project reduces the firm's US taxes paid by ⌧ US Y . In other words, the firm is unable to capture the full loss for tax purposes. The payo↵ on the project is (XC
In this case, the project's losses are less than the other US income Y and so the full loss reduces the firm's taxable income. With the project loss, the firm's tax liability is
In this case the project is profitable and the total after-tax payo↵ is
The firm chooses the scale C and the riskiness of the project to maximize the expected after-tax payo↵. Combining the payo↵s across the three regions described above, we can write the problem as
where f (X) denotes the probability density function for X.
Equation (10) shows the project's payo↵ as the pre-tax payo↵ less the US and foreign tax liabilities in the case of a positive project payo↵. Rearranging equation (10), we can write 8 this as
Written this way, Equation (12) shows the value of transfer pricing. With a foreign tax rate below the US rate, the ability to transfer intangible capital at a price p(X, C, ✓), less than its true market value ✓XC ↵ , allows the firm to save on taxes. The value of the tax savings generated by the transfer pricing is increasing in the amount of foreign operations, the di↵erence between the US and foreign tax rates (⌧ US ⌧ F ), and the di↵erence in the value of the intangible capital to foreign operations and its transfer price (✓XC ↵ p(X, C, ✓)).
Tax Options
The optimization problem in Equation (11) can equivalently be expressed as a maximization of the pre-tax profit and two tax options that characterize the firm's tax liability. In particular, the firm's problem can be written as
Rearranging gives
Equation (14) shows that the firm has a short position of ⌧ US C ↵ units of a call option on X with strike of (C Y )C ↵ and a long position of (⌧ US ⌧ F )✓C ↵ units of a call on X with strike of
✓C ↵ . The short position in the first call will incentivize lower , while the long position in the second call will incentivize a higher choice of . The magnitudes of these competing e↵ects will depend on number of units of each option as well as their strikes, which depend on other income Y , the choice of project scale C, and the transfer price p(X, C, ✓).
In the case that the firm's other income is su ciently large such that Y > C for any choice of C, then the problem in Equation (14) simplifies to:
In this case, there is only the long position in a call option, meaning the firm has incentive to choose a larger than in the case of symmetric linear taxes or zero taxes. 
Taxes with transfer pricing
in a lower tax liability on the project. In contrast, if the firm were unable to transfer price at a discount, then it would e↵ectively owe US taxes on all of its income. The dashed green line shows the taxes paid in this case where the firm cannot transfer price at a discount.
For comparison, the dashed green line shows the taxes that would be owed if the firm had to pay a tax rate of ⌧ US on all of its income. Alternatively, this dashed green line represents the tax liability on the project in the case that the firm were unable to transfer price at a discount.
Panel B of Figure 1 shows the case in which the firm has no other US taxable income (Y = 0). In this case, with no loss carryforward, the project's tax liability is convex in the project pre-tax income. This case of a convex tax liability is considered in Green and Talmor (1985) for a US firm with only domestic operations. They show that the firm's short position in this convex tax liability incentivizes less risk-taking and lower volatility of taxable income. In our setting, this e↵ect is still present. In the case that Y = 0, the choice of C and are lower thanĈ andˆ , the optimal choices in the case of zero taxes or a constant, Panel A shows the after-tax payo↵ on the project for the case where the firm's other income is positive. As with Figure 1 , the red, green, and blue lines correspond to Regions 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The dashed green line shows the project's after-tax payo↵ if the firm were unable to transfer price. Comparing this to the case of transfer pricing, represented by the solid blue line, we see that transfer pricing increases the after-tax payo↵ on the project. In addition, the transfer pricing changes the shape of this payo↵ as it generates convexity in the after-tax payo↵. Panel B of Figure 2 shows the after-tax payo↵ for the case where the firm has no other income. Here, the after-tax payo↵ is concave in the pre-tax income. However, the ability to transfer price, shown by the solid blue line, reduces the convexity.
The e↵ect of US and foreign tax rates
We now present comparative statics from the model to illustrate how the structure of tax rates and the ability to transfer price intangible capital to a low-tax jurisdiction a↵ect the optimal choices of R&D spending C and project risk . Table 1 In the case of zero other income, the firm's tax liability is convex in the project's pre-tax income, as shown in Panel B of Figure 1 . The firm has a short position in this convex tax liability and thus is incentivized to choose a lower . This convex tax liability that emerges from the limited use of losses, and the risk-averse behavior it induces, are shown by Green and Talmor (1985) . In this instance, an increase in the US tax rate results in a more convex tax liability and thus a lower choice of risk. That is, the blue dotted line in Panel A is decreasing in ⌧ US . In contrast, when the firm's other income is su ciently high, the optimal risk choice ⇤ is increasing in the US tax rate.
Panel B of Figure 3 shows that the e↵ect of the US tax rate on the optimal choice of project scale (C ⇤ ) is similar to its e↵ect on the choice of project risk. For the case of zero other income (dotted blue line), R&D is slightly decreasing in the US tax rate. However, for su ciently high other income, R&D is increasing in the US tax rate.
The plots in Panels A and B of Figure 3 show the counterintuitive result that a cut in the US tax rate could generate less R&D investment (C) and less risk-taking ( ⇤ ). As we will show, the positive relation between the US tax rate and R&D spending and risk-taking relies on the firm's ability to transfer price intellectual property at a discounted value and having other US taxable income against which it can apply losses. Empirically, these conditions apply to many US multinational firms with R&D that generates intangible capital.
Panels D and E of Figure 3 show the optimal risk-taking and R&D expenditure as functions of the foreign tax rate ⌧ F . In contrast to the US rate, the risk-taking and optimal R&D are both declining in the foreign tax rate. 
The e↵ect of discounted transfer pricing
In order to show the e↵ect of discounted transfer pricing, we compare the optimal policies for scale and riskiness in a case where the firm can transfer price at a discounted price to a case where it has to transfer the IP at the market value. In particular, we compare a case where the discounted transfer price is set to ✓C to a case where the IP is transferred at the market value of ✓XC ↵ . Figure 6 compares the optimal choice of risk and project scale, as well as the project NPV for these two cases as a function of the US tax rate. Each row of panels correspond to a di↵erent value of the firm's other income Y . In each panel, the solid blue line depicts the optimal policy or NPV for the case of discounted transfer pricing and the dashed red line displays the case of no discount on the transfer price. Panels A, B, and C, show that in the case where the firm has no other income (Y = 0), the choice of risk and project scale, as well as the NPV, are slightly decreasing in the US tax rate for both cases. However, the second row (Panels D and E) show that with a small amount of other income Y the e↵ect of the US tax rate on optimal policies has opposite signs for the two transfer pricing cases. When the firm is able to transfer price at a discount, the optimal scale and riskiness are slightly increasing in the US tax rate. However, when discounted transfer pricing is not allowed and the transfer price must be set to the market value, a higher US tax rate results in a slightly lower choice of project riskiness and scale.
The bottom two rows of Figure 6 show that when the firm has significant other income (Y = 1 and Y = 5), optimal riskiness and project scale increase significantly the US tax rate when the firm is able to transfer price at a discount (p = ✓C). In contrast, when the firm cannot transfer price at a discount, the choice of risk and project scale are una↵ected by a change in the US tax rate. Panels I and L of the figure show that while an increase in the US tax rate reduces the NPV in all cases, the e↵ect is significantly mitigated when a firm can transfer price at a discount compared to the case where it cannot.
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The choice of project risk
We assume that the firm can jointly choose the project's scale C as well as its riskiness . To understand how these two choices interact, we consider an alternative case of the model where the riskiness is fixed and the firm can only choose the choice of project scale C. For the case of fixed riskiness, we set toˆ , the value that maximizes the expected value of X, given by Equation (5), while all other parameters are kept at their respective values reported in Table 1 . The left column of Figure 7 plots the optimal choice of in the benchmark model as a function of the US tax rate for four di↵erent values of other income Y . In each panel, the black dotted line shows the value ofˆ for comparison. With no other income (Y = 0), Panel A shows that the optimal choice of risk is below and decreasing in the US tax rate. However, as the other income becomes larger, the optimal riskiness is higher thanˆ and increasing in the US tax rate.
The center column of Figure 7 compares the optimal choice of project scale C for the case where the firm jointly chooses the project risk (solid blue line) to the case where the project risk is fixed atˆ (dashed red line). Moving down this middle column, we see that the firm's other income has an important e↵ect on the relationship between the optimal scale in these two cases. In Panel B, with no other income, the firm would like to choose a value of less thanˆ . When it is unable to do so, it invests less in the project relative to the case where it is free to choose the risk. As the US tax rate increases, the project scale declines significantly for the fixed risk case, whereas it is roughly unchanged when the riskiness can be jointly chosen. Panel J of the figure shows that with su ciently large other income, there is a complementarity in the project scale and riskiness as functions of the US tax rate. As the US tax rate increases, the optimal project scale increases at a higher rate when the project risk can be jointly chosen than in the case of fixed project risk.
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4 Data
Data description and sample selection
We construct our sample from the Compustat North America Fundamentals Annual data set. Into these data we merge the Compustat Historical Segments data set. The 1997 implementation of FAS 131 changed how publicly listed US firms reported their foreign business segments (Albertus, Bird, Karolyi, and Ruchti (2018) ). Specifically, firms began reporting discontinuously more geographic segments starting in 1998. As a result, our sample begins in 1998. It ends in 2015, the last year comprehensive segment data were available at the time of writing.
We drop from the sample firms in the financial (NAICS 52-53), real estate (NAICS 53-54), and public administration (NAICS 92-99) industries, as they may be subject to unique regulatory regimes. In some cases, firmss' reported segment data correspond to regions, not countries. Since we wish to measure firms' exposure to foreign tax rates at the country-year level, we drop these regional segments. The result is a firm-country-year level panel, where each segment provides the sales by the firm in a specific country.
Into this panel we merge country-year level corporate income tax rates. To obtain as comprehensive a set of corporate income tax rates as possible, we combine data from several sources, including KPMG's Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Surveys, the University of Michigan's World Tax Database, and the Tax Foundation. When combined, these sources o↵er nearly complete coverage over the sample period.
On this data we impose two restrictions. First, since the tax convexity at the center of this paper can only emerge when a firm has foreign exposure, we require that at least 10% of a firm's consolidated sales are reported outside the US. Second, to ensure that the firm can use the deductions associated with undertaking risky projects in the US, we require firms have positive net income. This results in a sample of 10,639 firm-year observations.
Variable construction
The key variables in the empirical analysis are the measure of risk taking and the degree of the tax convexity faced by the firm. Their construction is described here. For a comprehensive set of variable definitions, see Appendix A.
Risk, the volatility of firms' cash flows, is the main response variable. We construct this variable from firms' consolidated financial data. 9 We begin by calculating the ratio of EBITDA to assets for each firm-year. Then we calculate the standard deviation of this quantity for the current and three following years. If the ratio of EBITDA to assets nonmissing for fewer than three of these years, we set Risk to be missing.
T axRate, each firm's weighted average tax rate, is the key predictor variable. To construct this variable, we first calculate each firm's US sales as the di↵erence between its consolidated sales and the sum of its sales across its foreign segments. We then obtain the firm's average statutory tax rate by weighting the tax rate for each country in which it has sales by the fraction of the firm's consolidated sales in that country. We use statutory tax rates to mitigate endogeneity concerns, following Dharmapala (2014) . 10 Hence if SalesF rac i,c,t is the fraction of firm i's consolidated sales in country c in year t and T axRate c,t is the country's tax rate, then
Conceptually, relative to the model, T axRate combines both the di↵erence in the US and foreign tax rates (⌧ US ⌧ F ) and the fraction of the firm's operations that are abroad (✓). Over the sample period, the US tax rate was constant at 35%. As a result, variation in the di↵erence between the US and foreign tax rates is determined by variation in the foreign tax rate.
9
The construction follows John, Litov, and Yeung (2008).
10
A possible alternative would be firms' e↵ective tax rates. These are directly determined by firm policy however, and may thereby exacerbate potential endogeneity problems. We begin by looking at the association between the convexity in a firm's tax rate, as proxied by T axRate and its cash flow volatility, as proxied by Risk. Specifically, we estimate the following regression specification with ordinary least squares, where i and t index firms and years.
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Descriptive statistics
We are parsimonious in our use of controls, indicated by X i,t , to avoid introducing endogeneity that may bias the estimate of . In particular, we control for firm Size and Age.
In section 5.1.3, we show our results are robust to measuring firm size with either sales (our baseline) or assets.
We also include industry fixed e↵ects, represented by ↵ k , to address potential selection concerns. For example, technology firms may tend to have both relatively risky cash flows and proportionally larger revenues in low tax foreign jurisdictions such as Ireland. Not accounting for this variation would result in a biased point estimate associated with T axRate.
Indeed, the bias postulated here would go in the same direction as the economic e↵ect we hypothesize.
Specifically, we used fixed e↵ects corresponding to two-digit NAICS codes.
Throughout the paper, we cluster standard errors by firm. In column two we add controls for firm size and age. The point estimate on T axRate falls in magnitude while remaining statistically significant. This is driven by the negative correlation between Risk and Size and the positive correlation between Size and T axRate, as indicated in Table 3 .
Results
In column three we again omit the controls but now add industry fixed e↵ects. The coe cient on T axRate is between its values in columns one and two and remains statistically significant.
Finally, in column four, we include both the controls and the fixed e↵ects. The point estimate on T axRate falls somewhat in magnitude to -0.124, although it remains statistically significant. We refer to the estimates in this column as our baseline tax-risk taking estimates.
Robustness checks
Next, in Table 7 , we turn to the robustness of the baseline taxes-risk taking result. We begin, in column one, by modifying our calculation of Risk. The modification follows one of the alternative measures described in John et al. (2008) . Specifically, we first calculate the average ratio of EBITDA to assets by year. We then subtract this value from the ratio of EBITDA to assets at the firm-year level before calculating each firm's adjusted cash flow volatility. Arguably, this additional adjustment better isolates firms risk-taking choices from broader economic fluctuations. The resulting point estimate corresponding to T axRate is marginally higher than the baseline estimate and remains statistically significant.
The calculations of both the key variables, Risk and T axRate, incorporate ratios with denominators that could take zero values. Hence a natural concern is that our results are driven by outliers and are therefore not representative of the typical firm. It is for this reason that we winsorize each variable at the 0.5% and 99.5% thresholds of its empirical distribution.
In column two, we confirm that these thresholds are adequate. In particular, we winsorize each variable at the 5% and 95% thresholds and re-estimate the baseline specification. Again, the coe cient on T axRate is similar in magnitude to the baseline and remains statistically significant.
In the baseline specification, we use the natural logarithm of one plus firm sales as a measure of firm size. We take this approach because assets appears in our calculation of
Risk.
A concern may be that including the same variable on both sides of equality in a regression specification may result in biased estimates. Nevertheless, in column three, we use the natural logarithm of one plus assets to measure firm size. The point estimate on T axRate is slightly higher and again is statistically significant. If using assets to measure size biases the estimates, its e↵ect is small.
Major tax changes
Thus far, we have presented evidence that taxes and risk taking are negatively correlated.
The strength of the above analysis is that it relies on all the variation in T axRate -both a firm's exposure to foreign tax rates and changes in the tax rates themselves -that we hypothesize should influence corporate risk taking. A drawback of this approach, however, is that it is di cult to ascertain whether firms' choices of Risk are caused by variation in T axRate. That is, there is no clear way to evaluate whether variation in T axRate is plausibly exogenous.
To make some headway on this dimension, we shift our focus to instances when firms are exposed to major tax cuts, following Giroud and Rauh (2015) and Akcigit, Grigsby, 12 We define a major tax cut as an instance when a country reduces its tax rate by at least 10 percentage points and a sample firm has at least 10% of its consolidated sales in that country. Table 5 lists the countries, years, and magnitudes of these changes. We then define M ajorT axCut as an indicator variable that equals one once a firm is subject to such a tax cut. If a firm is subject to more than one major tax cut, we omit observations for that firm in the year the second major tax cut occurs and thereafter.
With this new predictor variable, we estimate the following equation using ordinary least squares.
As in equation 17, i and t index firms and years, X i,t represents controls for Size and Age, and ↵ k represents industry fixed e↵ects. The results are in Table 8 . We indeed find that major tax cuts are associated with increases in risk taking. Because M ajorT axCut is an indicator variable, the sign is arguably more easily interpreted than the magnitude. Nevertheless, a firm exposed to a major tax cut increases Risk by 1.1%. Recall the mean for this variable is 6.9%.
Next we turn to the dynamics of firms' reponses to M ajorT axCut.
This specification mirrors equation 18, except M ajorT axCut i,t has been disaggregated over time. Specifically,
is an indicator variable that equals one in the year a tax major cut occurs.
MT C i,t+1 are defined similarly.
MT C i,t+2+ is M ajorT axCut i,t lagged twice. We find thatˆ 1 andˆ 2 are insignificant, consistent with the notion firms do not anticipate
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Our focus on tax cuts instead of tax changes more generally is due to the fact that there were no major tax increases over the sample period. major tax cuts. This, in turn, supports the interpretation that M ajorT axCut is exogenous with respect to Risk.
In contrast, we find thatˆ 3 ,ˆ 4 , andˆ 5 are positive and statistically significant. Firms appear to adjust their risk-taking promptly in response to changes in the convexity of their tax schedule. Moreover, the response does not appear to substantially increase or decrease in subsequent years. The magnitudes ofˆ 3 ,ˆ 4 , andˆ 5 are near that for the point estimate associated with M ajorT axCut. These results suggest that changes in the convexity of a firm's tax schedule cause the firm to change the riskiness of the projects it undertakes.
Conclusion
This paper studies the role of transfer pricing in corporate risk taking. We use a model to show that the di↵erential tax rates for profits in di↵erent countries combined with transfer pricing strategies can generate an asymmetry in the after-tax gains and losses of projects that produce intangible capital. This asymmetry can generate convexity in the payo↵s to these projects. As a result, US multinationals face the incentive to undertake riskier and larger scale projects.
We construct a panel of US firms with foreign operations for the period 1998-2015 to test our predictions. Consistent with the model, we find that the tax convexity is positively associated with risk taking. This finding is robust to potential selection concerns and holds when we rely on major foreign tax changes as a source of variation in the tax convexity.
Dynamic results indicate these changes are unanticipated by firms, mitigating the concern that our estimates are subject to endogeneity bias. In sum, our results suggest that the di↵erence in tax rates US multinationals encounter domestically and abroad, in combination with their ability to transfer price intangible capital out of the US, can influence their risk taking activities. Panel A: Y > 0 P a n e l B :
After-tax Payo↵
After-tax Payo↵ In Panels A and B, the dotted black line corresponds to the optimal choice of and C, respectively, for the case in which the firm faces a single symmetric tax rate ⌧ on all of its profits or losses.
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A. of risk ⇤ (left column), optimal choice of R&D C ⇤ (center column), and the project NPV (right column) as a function of the US tax rate. Each row corresponds to a di↵erent value of the firm's other income Y = {0, 0.5, 1, 5}. In each panel, the solid blue line shows the policy when the firm can transfer its intangible capital at a discounted price of ✓C. The red dashed line shows the policy choice if the firm were not allowed to transfer price at a discount and instead had to transfer the intangible capital at a price equal to its market value, ✓XC ↵ .
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A. ) and project NPV as functions of the US tax rate. The solid blue line displays the optimal choice of R&D and project NPV for the case where the firm is free to choose project risk . The dashed red line shows these for the case where the firm cannot choose and instead it is fixed atˆ . Each row of the figure corresponds to a di↵erent value of the firm's other income, Y = {0, 0.5, 1, 5}. ) where
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↵ is the returns to scale parameter for the project, ✓ is the fraction of the firm's operations that are foreign, Y is the firm's other taxable income, ⌧ US is the US corporate tax rate, and ⌧ F is the foreign corporate tax rate. Unless stated otherwise, we set the discounted transfer price to ✓C. This table displays the correlations between the main variables used in the analysis. Risk measures a firm's cash flow volatility for the current and three future years. T axRate is a firm's average tax rate, as weighted by the global distribution of its sales. Detailed definitions for both these variables are contained in section 4.2. Size is the natural logarithm of one plus sales. Age is the natural logarithm on one plus the number of years since the firm first appears in the data. F SaleF rac is the ratio of the firm's foreign sales to its consolidated sales. SegCount is the number of a firm's foreign geographic segments. This table presents results on the association between the tax convexity and risk taking. Risk measures a firm's cash flow volatility for the current and three future years. T axRate is a firm's average tax rate, as weighted by the global distribution of its sales. Detailed definitions for both these variables are contained in section 4.2. Size is the natural logarithm of one plus sales. Age is the natural logarithm on one plus the number of years since the firm first appears in the data. Fixed e↵ects are by two-digit NAICS codes. We refer to column four as the baseline estimates. Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. This table verifies the robustness of the negative association between taxes and risk taking. In column one we demean ratio of EBITDA to assets by year, following John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) . In column two we winsorize each variable at the 5% and 95% thresholds of its empirical distribution. In column three we measure Size as one plus the natural logarithm of assets. Fixed e↵ects are by two-digit NAICS codes. Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. This table examines the e↵ects on risk taking of major foreign tax cuts. Risk measures a firm's cash flow volatility for the current and three future years; a detailed definition for both this variable is contained in section 4.2. MajorT axCut i,t is an indicator variable that equals one once a tax cut that exceeds 10 percentage points occurs in a country in which a sample firm has a segment comprising at least 10% of the firms' consolidated sales.
MT C i,t
is an indicator variable that equals one in the year a tax major cut occurs. MT C i,t+2+ is MajorT axCut lagged twice. Size is the natural logarithm of one plus sales. Age is the natural logarithm on one plus the number of years since the firm first appears in the data. Fixed e↵ects are by two-digit NAICS codes. Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
